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Humans rarely confuse variations in light intensity, such as shadows, shading, light sources and specular
reﬂections, from variations in material properties, such as albedo or pigment. This review explores the
cues, or regularities in the visual world that evidence suggests vision exploits to discriminate light from
material. These cues include luminance relations, ﬁgural relations, 3D-shape, depth, colour, texture, and
motion. On the basis of an examination of the cues together with the behavioural evidence that they are
used by vision, I propose a set of heuristics that may guide vision in the task of distinguishing between
light and material. I argue that while there is evidence for the use of these heuristics, little is known about
their relative importance and the manner in which they are combined in naturalistic situations where
there are multiple cues as to what is light and what is material. Finally, I discuss two theoretical frame-
works, the generic view principle and Bayesian estimation, that are beginning to help us understand the
visual processes involved in distinguishing between light and material.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Light versus material
The visual world not only consists of materials but patterns of
light, which include shadows, shading, specular reﬂections, spot-
lights and light sources. Distinguishing light from material is not
only important for detecting what is material: the pattern of light
itself provides information about the type of material, its shape
and the object to which it belongs. How do we distinguish light
from material? The problem may be considered one of decompos-
ing an image into ‘layers’, or what Barrow and Tenenbaum (1978)
have termed ‘intrinsic images’, in which each layer, or intrinsic im-
age, has a different physical origin. Layer decomposition is a classic
problem of inverse optics: given a piece of image data such as a
change in luminance, which has many possible causes, what is
the cause? This review aims to summarize what we know about
how the visual system decomposes the visual input into light
and material. The focus will be on the regularities, or cues in the
natural visual environment that evidence suggests vision exploits
for this purpose, cues that include luminance relationships, surface
geometry, ﬁgural arrangements, 3D-shape, depth, colour, texture
and motion. The review will not deal with how we distinguish dif-ll rights reserved.ferent types of material (coloured versus achromatic, rough versus
smooth etc.), except with regard to distinguishing reﬂectance sur-
faces from transparency, for reasons given below. Nor will the re-
view consider how the pattern of light is used to determine
object properties (e.g. lightness, colour, shape, texture), except in
so far as these things tell us about the cues used by vision for dis-
criminating light from material in the ﬁrst place. For example,
while studies of the lightness, or perceived shade of grey of stimu-
lus patterns have revealed many cues used by vision to distinguish
light from material, the signiﬁcance of these studies for lightness
perception is not discussed except in passing. Similarly, while
studies of shape-from-shading have revealed how luminance, color
and texture are exploited by vision for discriminating light from
material, the review will not deal with how vision actually derives
shape from shading. And while the review describes some of the
cues that are likely used for identifying specular reﬂections, the
strengths and limitations of specular reﬂections for identifying
material properties will not be discussed.
1.2. The issue
Fig. 1 exempliﬁes the problem and suggests likely cues to the
solution. The luminance image L(x,y) of the cylinder can be decom-
posed into two layers, one reﬂectance R(x,y), the other non-uniform
illumination, I(x,y). This follows from the relation L(x,y) = I(x,y)
Fig. 1. An image decomposed into reﬂectance and illumination layers.
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pixel whether it is part of a light surface that is shaded or a dark sur-
face brightly illuminated. Pixel luminance is inherently ambiguous
because an inﬁnite number of combinations of the two unknowns,
R(x,y) and I(x,y) can produce L(x,y). Only by examining the relations
among pixels combined with prior knowledge about the circum-
stances in which reﬂectance changes and non-uniform illumination
occur can one estimate the real-world properties R(x,y) and L(x,y).
In Fig. 1 the cylinder appears to be shaded, and as a result looks
rounded not ﬂat, a consequence of ‘shape-from-shading’. The main
cue that the luminance changes on the cylinder are shading is that
they are gradual, though shading is also consistent with the cylin-
drical shape suggested by the curved contour at the top of the cyl-
inder (however this is insufﬁcient on its own to elicit an impression
of a cylinder, as can be seen from the reﬂectance image). The task of
distinguishing reﬂectance from illumination is therefore accom-
plished by comparing points across the image and using prior
knowledge of the spatial properties of both shading and shape.
1.3. Types of layer
Fig. 1 illustrates what is meant by reﬂectance, shadow and
shading. When appropriate, intensive reﬂectance or the shade-of-
grey of a surface will be termed albedo, and the spectral reﬂectance
of a surface pigment. The perceptual correlates of intensive and
spectral reﬂectance are lightness and colour. The term brightness
will be used to denote perceived luminance. A shadow results from
occlusion of a light source, while shading (sometimes termed an at-
tached shadow) results from a change in the angle of the surface
normal with respect to the direction of illumination. Other types
of non-uniform illumination discussed here include: spotlights
(Fig. 2a), which are local brightly illuminated regions; self-luminos-
ity, i.e. light sources (Fig. 4); specular reﬂections (Fig. 5), which are
sometimes called highlights. The last of these, specular reﬂections,
are seen on shiny or metallic surfaces in non-diffuse illumination,
and occur because shiny surfaces do not reﬂect light equally in all
directions (termed ‘non-Lambertian’).
Another type of layer considered here is transparency (ﬁgures
throughout text). Although transparencies are materials rather
than light, they not only behave similarly to light, but are the basis
of some of the most compelling demonstrations of the cues in-
volved in light-versus-material perception (e.g. Adelson, 1993;
Adelson, 2000; Logvinenko, Adelson, Ross, & Somers 2005). The
physical properties of transparency include: transmittance, deﬁned
as the proportion of light that passes through the medium; reﬂec-
tance, deﬁned as the proportion of light reﬂected by the medium;
scatter, deﬁned as the amount of dispersion of lightwithin themed-
ium. A standard pair of dark glasses transmits a proportion of the
incident light but reﬂects almost no light, and hence acts similarly
to a shadow by dividing the background luminance by a constantfactor, thus reducing the light level while leaving the contrast of
objects viewed through them unchanged (Fig. 2b). Transparencies
that reﬂect as well as transmit light are referred to as having a
reﬂective or additive component, and reduce the contrast of objects
seen through them. They include media such as frosted glass,
grease-proof paper, milky water and fog, and are characterized by
their cloudy appearance (Fig. 2c). Finally, a close relative of trans-
parency is the delicate, illusory phenomenon of neon-colour spread-
ing (Anderson, 1997; Bressan, Mingolla, Spillmann, & Watanabe,
1997; Hoffman, 1998; van Tuijl, 1975), whose appearance resem-
bles both self-luminosity and reﬂective transparency (Figs. 6b
and 10e).
In summary this review deals with the cues that underpin the
decomposition of visual stimulation into different perceptual cate-
gories or ’layers’, corresponding to reﬂectance (albedo and pig-
ment), shadows, shading, spotlights, light sources, specular
reﬂections, transparency and neon-colour spreading.
1.4. Brief history
Theuseofpriorknowledge tohelpdistinguish light frommaterial
is an example of what Helmholtz famously termed ‘‘unconscious
inference” (Helmholtz, 1866/1962). One of Helmholtz’s most cele-
brated examples of unconscious inference was simultaneous colour
contrast, the phenomenon inwhich, to take just one example, a grey
patch surrounded by green appears tinged with pink- the comple-
mentary colour of green. Helmholtz offeredmore than one explana-
tion for simultaneous colour contrast (Turner, 1994), but they each
had in common the idea that the visual systemattributed to the illu-
minant the colour of the patch surround, and it was this that led to
the misperception. Although Helmholtz’s explanation(s) for simul-
taneous colour contrast continue to be disputed (e.g. see critique
by James (1890/1981), discussed by Kingdom, 1997), they high-
lighted the idea that the visual system is able to decompose the im-
age into illumination and pigment. Helmholtz’s contemporary and
adversaryHering also drewattention to the importance of layer per-
ception in his famous shadows experiment (Hering, 1874/1964).
Hering showed that if one drew a thick black line to cover the pen-
umbraof a cast shadow, the appearance of the shadowchanged from
one of dark illumination to different shade of grey [see recent appli-
cationsof thismanipulation to faceperception inCavanaghandLecl-
erc (1989) and Cavanagh and Kennedy (2000)].
In more recent times Gilchrist & colleagues’ theory of ‘‘edge
classiﬁcation”, formulated in the context of lightness perception
(Gilchrist, 1979; Gilchrist, Delman, & Jacobsen, 1983; reviewed
by Gilchrist, 2006), and Metelli’s (1974) theory of ‘‘scission”, for-
mulated in the context of transparency perception, have been sem-
inal in revealing the importance of layer perception in vision. Using
the display illustrated in Fig. 2a, Gilchrist (1979) and Gilchrist et al.
(1983) showed that the lightness of a patch depended on whether
Fig. 2. (a) Gilchrist’s (1979) experiment comparing the lightness of two test patches whose surrounds differed in either in illumination (left) or albedo (right). The inset shows
the luminance arrangement at the at the illumination edge (an X-junction), which satisﬁes the ratio invariance rule. (b) A non-reﬂective transparency, or shadow, also
satisﬁes ratio-invariance. (c) Two intersecting shadows show difference-invariance; (d) transparency with a reﬂective component, resulting in reduced contrast inside the
transparent region, but of the same sign. (e) The transparent region has been rotated by 180 deg, which preserves the X-junctions but reverses the sign of the contrast of the
transparent region, eliminating the impression of transparency. In (f) the transparency in b has been rotated by just 10 deg, and the lack of a well-deﬁned X-junction
eliminates the impression of transparency. Top ﬁgure without inset taken from Gilchrist (2006) and reproduced with permission.
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tion or albedo, in spite of the fact that the luminance contrast be-
tween patch and surround was the same in both conﬁgurations1
(the actual displays used real papers and lights, and the effects re-
ported are larger than can be seen in the ﬁgure). Later, Gilchrist
(1988) suggested that two cues were critical to classifying the sur-
round as differing in illumination rather than albedo—X-junctions
and luminance-ratio-invariance—cues that also ﬁgure in Metelli’s
work and which will be discussed later. Gilchrist’s and Metelli’s
studies laid the foundation for many subsequent demonstrations
showing how perceived transparency (e.g. Adelson, 1993; Anderson
& Winawer, 2005; Logvinenko et al., 2005) and perceived shading, or
shadows (Adelson, 2000; Adelson & Pentland, 1996; Logvinenko,
1999; see also earlier studies by Arend & Spehar, 1993a, 1993b)1 Although the present author has criticized the interpretation of this experiment
with regard to lightness perception (Kingdom, 2003a), its historical signiﬁcance for
our understanding of layer perception is unquestionable.can dramatically inﬂuence the lightness and/or brightness of regions
that appear part of the material layer. Moreover Metelli’s studies
established transparency perception as a distinct sub-discipline
within vision science (e.g. Albert, 2006; Anderson, Singh, & Meng,
2006; Beck & Ivry, 1988; Gerbino, 1994, chap. 5; Gerbino, Stultiens,
Troost, & de Weert, 1990; Gurnsey, Kingdom, & Schoﬁeld, submitted
for publication; Kanizsa, 1979; Kasrai & Kingdom, 2001, 2002; Ma-
sin, 1997, 2006; Robilotto, Khang, & Zaidi, 2002; Robilotto & Zaidi,
2004; Singh & Anderson, 2002a, 2002b).
This brief summary of some of the pertinent historical moments
sets the scene for an examination of the physical cues evidence
suggests vision exploits to discriminate light from material. The
examination will result in a list of heuristics, or ‘rough-and-ready’
rules used by vision to designate regions as either reﬂectance, sha-
dow, shading, spotlight, light-source, specular reﬂection or trans-
parency. It must be born in mind at the outset however that
none of the heuristics should be regarded as a hard-and-fast rule.
Each is a clue to whether a luminance change is more or less likely
F.A.A. Kingdom /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2090–2105 2093to be light than material given its context. The heuristics are prob-
abilistic (although no actual probabilities are provided) meaning
that any one heuristic can in principle be overruled by any other
if there is sufﬁcient evidence to favour the alternative interpreta-
tion. In natural scenes multiple cues for distinguishing light from
material co-exist and their relative weightings and the nature of
their interactions are only beginning to be understood. Therefore
at the very least one should append the following sufﬁx to every
heuristic listed below: ‘‘. . .. . .provided no cues to the contrary are
present”.
2. Cues and heuristics
2.1. Luminance relations
2.1.1. Invariances at intersecting edges
When an illumination edge intersects a reﬂectance edge to form
an X-junction, the ratio of luminances either side of the junction is
the same (Gilchrist, 1988, 2006, p184). This is because the effect of
illumination on a surface is multiplicative, changing its mean lumi-
nance but not its luminance ratios since a/b is unchangedwhenboth
a and b aremultiplied by the same factor. Since a luminance ratio is a
measure of contrast, the ratio invariance cue can also be termed the
contrast invariance cue. Ratio invariance is illustrated for the spot-
light inGilchrist’s display (Fig. 2a), and for the shadowor non-reﬂec-
tive transparency in Fig. 2b. Although ratio invariance is evidence for
the presence of an illumination edge, it does not tell uswhich edge is
the illumination edge, since if a/b = c/d, also a/c = b/d. The ambiguity
is observable in the inset in Fig. 2a which shows the X-junction re-
moved from its context. Ratio invariance is also consistent with
two, intersecting, non-reﬂective transparencies.
Other types of edgeviolate ratio-invariancebutpreserve the sign,
or polarity of contrast across the X-junction. Difference-invariance,
i.e. a  b = cd, occurs when two illumination edges intersect (Gil-
christ, 2006, p. 184–185), as in the overlapping shadows example
in Fig. 2c. Difference-invariance results from the fact that the inten-
sities of superimposed illuminations add not multiply. Intersecting
illumination edges are very common in nature, for example in the
dappled illumination in foliage. Difference-invariance represents a
special case of the more general situation in which the magnitude
but not sign of contrast changes across the junction. The general sit-
uation is characterizedby the fact that if a  b = cd and a + b > c + d,
then a/b < c/d. In this situation, a reduction in contrast but not sign at
an X-junction is a signature for a transparency with a reﬂective, or
additive component, as In Fig. 2d.
On the behavioural side, the impressions of transparency in
Fig. 2b–e are certainly compelling, and the importance of preserv-
ing the sign of contrast across the X-junction can be seen in Fig. 2e,
where the polarity is reversed and the impression of transparency
eliminated. Moreover, we are sensitive to the different physical
properties of transparency: the cloudy appearance of the central
region in Fig. 2d is a signature for a transparency with a reﬂective
component. Singh and Anderson (2002a) have argued that the
combination of contrast-sign-invariance and contrast reduction
in Fig. 2d is a general trigger for unambiguous perceptual scission,
unambiguous in the sense that the lower contrast region is always
perceived as a foreground transparency and the higher contrast re-
gion the background. Compare for example Fig. 2b and d. Pro-
longed ﬁxation of Fig. 2b may produce perceptual reversals in
the ordering of layers, whereas in Fig. 2d one tends not to experi-
ence layer reversals.
There are many unanswered questions concerning the lumi-
nance relations at X-junctions. For example, can we distinguish
overlapping non-reﬂective transparencies from overlapping shad-
ows using X-junction information alone, given that one layer com-
bination exhibits ratio-, the other difference-invariance? Sincesmall violations from ratio invariance are probably imperceptible
(Kasrai & Kingdom, 2001; Kingdom, Beauce, & Hunter, 2004) it
would seem unlikely. Another question concerns how the two
principle physical properties of transparency, transmittance and
reﬂectance, are encoded by vision. This complex and controversial
issue is beyond the scope of this review, but the interested reader
may consult recent articles by Masin, Tommasi, and Da Pos (2007),
Albert (in press), Anderson and Singh (in press) and Gurnsey et al.
(submitted for publication).
Heuristic 1a. If two intersecting edges show luminance ratio
invariance, one edge is likely to be an illumination edge or non-
reﬂective transparency, the other a reﬂectance edge.
Heuristic 1b. If two intersecting edges show luminance differ-
ence invariance, both edges are likely to be illumination edges.
Heuristic 1c. If the contrast but not sign of an edge changes as it
intersects another edge, but difference-invariance is not shown,
the lower contrast side of the edge is likely to be a transparency
with a reﬂective component.
Heuristic 1d. If the contrast sign changes across two intersecting
edges, the edges are both likely to be reﬂectance edges.
2.1.2. Invariances in textures
Luminance-ratio (or -contrast) invariance applies also to tex-
tured surfaces. Just as a shadow reduces the mean but not contrast
of a luminance edge, so too will it reduce the mean but not contrast
of luminance variations in a texture. Schoﬁeld, Heese, Rock, and
Georgeson (2006) investigated whether humans were sensitive
to luminance-contrast invariance in textures in the context of
shape-from shading. Fig. 3 demonstrates the main ﬁnding. The ﬁg-
ure comprises two sinusoidal luminance gratings in a plaid conﬁg-
uration superimposed on a noise texture. In the right oblique
component the local luminance amplitude of the texture is varied
in-phase with the luminance grating, such that luminance contrast
is constant. This component is consistent with shading of a uni-
form textured surface and is indeed seen as undulating in depth.
In the left oblique component the luminance amplitude of the
noise texture is varied in anti-phase with the luminance grating,
and hence luminance contrast varies. In this case the modulation
is not consistent with shading, and indeed observers perceive the
anti-phase combination as relatively ﬂat. Together with the results
of other experiments, Schoﬁeld et al. (2006) conclude that local
luminance amplitude can be a key to disambiguate the origin of
luminance variations in an image (shading versus albedo), but that
it is not effective in all circumstances.
Heuristic 2. If the luminance contrast of a texture is the same on
either side of a luminance edge, the edge is likely to be an illumi-
nation edge or non-reﬂective transparency. On the other hand if
texture luminance contrast is different on either side of the lumi-
nance edge, the lower contrast region is likely to be a reﬂective
transparency or a texture with different luminance contrast.
2.1.3. Penumbra and gradients
Hering’s demonstration described above, in which a shadow
changed in appearance to albedo when its penumbra was covered
with a black line may have less to do with removing the penumbra
as with reversing the polarity at the shadow’s edge (Cavanagh &
Leclerc, 1989; Kennedy & Bai, 2000; Cavanagh & Kennedy, 2000).
Indeed many shadows have sharp edges, and still appear as shad-
ows. Irrespective of the precise reason for the loss in shadow
appearance in Hering’s demonstration however, numerous studies
since Hering have suggested that gradual luminance changes are
signatures for non-uniform illumination (Agostini & Galmonte,
2002; Hoffman, 1998; Kanizsa, 1979; Land & McCann, 1971;
MacLeod, 1947; Schirillo & Shevell, 1997; Zavagno, 1999; Zavagno
& Caputo, 2001; Correani, Scott-Samuel, & Leonard, 2006; reviewed
by Gilchrist, 2006). An elegant demonstration of the importance of
Fig. 3. A plaid consisting of two, orthogonal, sinusoidal luminance gratings is added
to a noise texture. The noise texture itself is modulated in amplitude along both
component orientations. In the left oblique component the luminance and ampli-
tude modulations are in anti-phase, such that the peaks of luminance align with the
troughs in amplitude, and no depth corrugations are perceived. In the right oblique
component the luminance and amplitude modulations are in-phase, such that the
peaks of luminance align with the peaks in amplitude, and depth corrugations are
perceived. From Schoﬁeld et al. (2006), reproduced with permission.
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Elder, Trithart, Pintilie, and MacLean’s (2004) crescent patterns in
Fig. 4a. Switching the penumbra from the inside to the outside of
a crescent changes the percept from shading to shadow. This seems
to reveal one or other of two in-built assumptions, the ﬁrst that the
sharp edges of the crescent are occlusion boundaries (Anderson,
personal communication), or second that objects tend to be con-
vex-shaped.
Land and McCann (1971) based their famous Retinex algorithm,
which was aimed at recovering the reﬂectance map of a Mondrian-
like pattern that was obliquely illuminated, on the idea that grad-
ual luminance gradients are caused by illumination. The algorithm
removed the gradual luminance gradients associated with shading
by (a) computing the 1D (ﬁrst derivative) of the pattern’s lumi-
nance map, then (b) imposing a threshold on the 1D map and then
(c) re-integrating the 1D map to produce an image identical to the
original minus the gradual luminance gradient. In principle one
could go one step further and recover the shading image by sub-
tracting the reﬂectance map from the original. The Retinex would
presumably predict the appearance of Kingdom’s (2003a) ﬁgure
shown in Fig. 4b (which was inspired by Adelson’s checkerboard-
shadow illusion: http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/check-
ershadow_illusion.html). One hardly notices the gradual lumi-
nance gradient in the ﬁgure, because the gradient is both gradual
and low contrast. The important point however is that the light-
nesses of the diamonds within each row appear very similar even
though their luminances are very different. This is the ‘correct’
percept if the gradual luminance gradient is indeed shading2. The2 The more remarked-upon corollary of this type of ﬁgure is that diamonds a and b,
which have the same luminance, appear very different in brightness. However this
would only be remarkable if the visual system had access to absolute luminance. In
this type of ﬁgure the dominant feature of the diamonds is lightness, and this is
perceived near-veridically.oft-noted shortcoming of the Retinex however is that it fails for pat-
terns with relatively sharp illumination gradients, as in Fig. 2, since
these would be identiﬁed as reﬂectance changes. Numerous studies
attest to lightness being accurately perceived even in the context of
sharp illumination changes (Arend & Spehar, 1993a; Arend & Spehar,
1993b; summarized by Arend, 1994), suggesting that sharp as well
as gradual changes of luminance can be correctly identiﬁed as
illumination.
Fig. 4c shows how a suitable arrangement of luminance gradi-
ents provides a compelling impression of a light source, one that
glows and is ‘brighter-than-white’ (Agostini & Galmonte, 2002;
Gori & Stubbs, 2006; Zavagno, 1999; Zavagno & Caputo, 2001; Cor-
reani et al., 2006). Thus as with Elder et al.s (2004) crescent ﬁgures,
gradients are not only useful for discriminating light frommaterial,
but different types of light. The above considerations lead to the
following heuristic:
Heuristic 2. Gradual luminance gradients are likely to be illumi-
nation changes, whereas sharp luminance gradients can be either
changes in illumination, transparency or albedo.
2.1.4. Contrast magnitude
Although luminance gradients are probably the most effective
cues for eliciting impressions of self-luminosity, such impressions
can occur in the absence of gradients. Gilchrist (2006) argues that
the conditions which produce impressions of self-luminosity in the
absence of gradients are complex and not yet fully understood.
Bonato and Gilchrist (1994); see also Gilchrist, 2006, p. 246–265)
found that a region appeared self-luminous if the ratio of its lumi-
nance to that of a region appearing white was about 2.2. Fig. 4d
suggests that at least under some circumstances small regions of
high contrast, especially if they are ‘outliers’, appear either self-
luminous or as spotlights. In this case self-luminosity could in part
be detected by a mechanism that encoded the variance in contrasts
within a display and identiﬁed as a light source any contrast that
exceeded some threshold multiple of the contrast variance. If so
this leads to the following heuristics.
Heuristic 3a. Regions appearing signiﬁcantly brighter than white
are likely to be self-luminous or spotlights.
Heuristic 3b. Positive outlier contrasts are likely to be self-lumi-
nous or spotlights.
Illumination edges appear lower in contrast than equal-in-con-
trast reﬂectance edges (Logvinenko, 2005), and the hues of grey re-
gions illuminated by coloured light appear less saturated than if
the colours are perceived as pigment (Jakobsson, Bergström,
Gustaffson, & Fedorovskaya, 1997). Although it does not follow
from these observations that low contrast regions are more likely
perceived as illumination, Ekroll, Faul, and Niederee (2004) have
put forward an interesting hypothesis consistent with the idea.
Although their hypothesis has been framed within the context of
chromatic contrast, it is also relevant to achromatic contrast, so
is dealt with here. Ekroll et al. were struck by the observation that
the hues of low contrast patches on uniform surrounds often ap-
pear more saturated than might be expected. To account for this
they suggest that low contrast patches on uniform surrounds trig-
ger a process of perceptual scission that results in a two-layered
percept: a background layer the colour of the surround and a fore-
ground, transparent layer whose colour is a function of the contrast
between patch and surround. For a coloured patch on a grey back-
ground the two potential layers are grey background and satu-
rated-hue foreground. At high contrasts the two layers are fused,
and so the hue is desaturated because of the contribution of the
grey component. However at low contrasts the components split,
and the foreground transparent layer, which carries the colour,
dominates, giving the patch its saturated hue appearance.
Although the impression of transparency in low-contrast patches
on uniform surrounds is not particularly compelling, Ekroll
Fig. 4. (a) A crescent-shaped luminance proﬁle can be perceived either as shading (bottom left) or shadow (bottom right) depending on which side is blurred; from Elder et al.
(2004), reproduced with permission. (b) A single cycle of a vertical sinusoidal luminance grating is added to a checkerboard. The lightnesses of the diamonds in any row
appear very similar, suggesting that the visual system identiﬁes the sinusoidal luminance variation as shading not albedo. An incidental fact is that diamonds a and b have the
same luminance. From Kingdom (2003a), reproduced with permission. (c) Four luminance ramps that converge towards the luminance of the background give a strong
impression of a light source; from Agostini and Galmonte (2002), reproduced with permission. (d) Patches whose contrasts are positive outliers are sometimes perceived as
spotlights or self-luminous.
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tional view that changes in perceived saturation with contrast
are caused by changes in contrast gain (e.g. Brown & MacLeod,
1997). Their scission hypothesis may also partly explain the
impression of diffuse glow in the light-source ﬁgure in Fig. 4c.
Although impressions of transparency experienced for low contrast
reﬂectance patches on uniform surrounds are illusory, they may
reﬂect an in-built assumption that isolated low-contrast patches
are likely to be transparencies or illumination. In turn this might
reﬂect the fact that in nature low contrast regions are more likely
to be illumination than albedo or pigment. If so, an adventurous
heuristic is:
Heuristic 4. Regions of low contrast on uniform surrounds are
more likely to be caused by illumination or transparency than albe-
do or pigment.
2.1.5. Contrast polarity
The local luminance contrasts in textures not only have magni-
tude but sign (or polarity) depending on whether they are incre-
ments or decrements. The relative proportion of increments and
decrements in a texture is reﬂected in the skew of the pixel lumi-
nance histogram: a predominance of decrements results in nega-
tive skew, and of increments positive skew (Kingdom, Hayes, &
Field, 2001). Recently, Motoyoshi, Nishida, and Adelson (2005)
and Motoyoshi, Nishida, Sharan, and Adelson (2007) showed thatartiﬁcially skewing the luminance pixel histogram of a natural tex-
tured object can shift its appearance either to matte when skewed
negatively or to glossy when skewed positively, as shown in Fig. 5.
The shifts are consistent with a change in appearance of the surface
markings from shading to specular reﬂection. Motoyoshi et al.
(2007) suggest that the perceived differences in material resulting
from differences in skew could result from the relative activities of
neural ﬁlters with On- and Off-centre receptive ﬁelds, which are
preferentially sensitive, respectively, to increments and
decrements.
Heuristic 5. Negative skew in the luminance histogram of tex-
tured surfaces is evidence of shading, whereas positive skew is evi-
dence of specular reﬂection.
2.2. Figural relations
Figural relations, as used here, refer to the arrangement and ori-
entation of surface contours.
2.2.1. Junctions
Junctions form an important class of ﬁgural arrangement, and
X-junctions, which have already been described, are widely be-
lieved to be signatures for non-uniform illumination and transpar-
ency (Adelson, 1993; Gilchrist, 1988). Eliminating the X-junction
from Fig. 2b by rotating the central region by only 10 deg, as in
Fig. 5. (a) Skewing the pixel histogram of a textured surface towards the right creates the impression of specular reﬂections on a shiny metallic surface, whereas (b) skewing
towards the left creates the impression of a dull matte surface with shading. From Motoyoshi et al. (2007), reproduced with permission.
3 As with the checkerboard-shading ﬁgure in Fig. 4b, the more remarked-upon
percept in this type of ﬁgure is that b and c, which have the same luminance, appear
markedly different in brightness and lightness. However as argued earlier, if the
ﬁgure were a real object, the perceived lightness relations a=b>c are correct.
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the X-junction (Kasrai & Kingdom, 2002). Two other types of junc-
tion implicated in layer perception are T- and I-junctions (Ander-
son, 1997, 2001; Hoffman, 1998; Kanizsa, 1979). Fig. 6a, based
on Kanizsa (1979), shows that T-junctions can trigger the impres-
sion of transparency, while Fig. 6b demonstrates that I-junctions
(Anderson, 1997) can trigger the achromatic version of neon-col-
our spreading (Fig. 10e shows the more compelling chromatic ver-
sion). An important constraint on the effectiveness with which
T- and I-junctions generate impressions of transparency and
neon-colour spreading is that they are multiply arranged in a man-
ner consistent with the presence of a simple-shaped transparent
overlay. X-junctions on the other hand are sufﬁcient on their
own to produce impressions of illumination/transparency, though
the impressions are enhanced by multiple arrangements of the
junction (see Fig. 2).
2.2.2. Straightness
If either border at an X-junction changes orientation at the junc-
tion, the impression of illumination/transparency is reduced, as
Fig. 7a and b from Kanizsa (1979) attests. The change in percept re-
ﬂects knowledge that in the natural world, illumination, transpar-
ency and reﬂectance edges do not by and large coincide, and
therefore only rarely will a change in orientation of one type of
edge coincide with the intersection of another. So when such an
event does occur, we attribute it to different cause, namely a reﬂec-
tance change. In Fig. 7c, Logvinenko et al. (2005) extend this theme
and show that introducing curvature to an edge can change the
impression from illumination/transparency to albedo. Besides the
change in percept, Logvinenko et al. showed that the brightness
difference between the equal-in-luminance spots placed either
side of the edge was greater in the straight compared to curved
edge condition. This would be expected if the brightness of the
patches in the straight edge condition were strongly inﬂuenced
by their lightnesses ‘as seen through’ the illumination/transpar-
ency. It would be wrong however to conclude from Fig. 7c that
straight edges are in and of themselves perceived as illumination
edges; the presence of X-junctions with the appropriate luminancerelations in the ﬁgure strongly suggest illumination/transparency.
Hence one can say:




Changes in luminance that accompany changes in surface orien-
tation tend to be perceived as shading (Fig. 8a; a versus b), whereas
luminance changes on a ﬂat surface tend to be perceived as
changes in reﬂectance (Fig. 8a; b versus c)3. Knill and Kersten’s
(1991) demonstration in Fig. 8b neatly illustrates how the introduc-
tion of perceived surface curvature can shift the impression of a
luminance discontinuity away from reﬂectance (left) towards shad-
ing (right).
Two other studies that reveal the importance of surface geom-
etry for material-versus-light perception employ chromatic dis-
plays. Jakobsson et al0s. (1997; see also Bergström, 2004)
AMBEGUJAS demonstration (the acronym is a contraction of the
authors’ names) shows the effect in terms of perceived saturation.
Subjects were shown a ﬁgure similar to the one shown in Fig. 10a-i.
The top and bottom colours were produced by illuminating an ach-
romatic stripe pattern with different coloured lights. The pattern
appeared to alternate between the ‘tile’ and ‘roof’ percepts illus-
trated in Figs. 10a-ii and 10a-iii. During the tile percept, the hues
looked saturated, whereas during the roof percept they appeared
washed out. Jakobsson et al. suggest that the differences in per-
ceived saturation dependent on perceived shape were caused by
the fact that during the tile percept the two colours were perceived
as different pigments, whereas during the roof percept they were
perceived as different illuminations.
Fig. 6. (a) T-junctions can elicit an impression of transparency. Based on a similar ﬁgure in Kanizsa (1979). (b) I-junctions elicit an impression of achromatic neon-colour
spreading.
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shaped card magenta on one half and white on the other. Some
of the light from the magenta half was reﬂected onto the white
half, and as a result subjects perceived a pinkish glow on the white
side. However when the perceived shape of the card was inverted
with a pseudoscope, so that the card appeared convex (like so <,
viewed from the left), the white half of the card took on a deep ma-
genta color. Bloj et al. attributed the shift in colour percept caused
by the change in perceived shape to the visual system’s knowledge
of physical inter-reﬂection. The reﬂected light from the magenta
half that fell on the white half tended to be discounted in the nor-
mal view because the geometry was consistent with inter-reﬂec-
tion between surfaces. However in the inverted-shape, convex
view, the arrangement was not consistent with inter-reﬂection
and the light reﬂected from the magenta half was attributed to
the surface of the white half, which therefore appeared magenta.
The readermay have noticed a contradiction between the results
ofAMBEGUJASandBloj et al. In theAMBEGUJASexperiment, the roof
percept allegedly favoured the interpretation that the two colourswere different illuminants, whereas in Bloj et al.’s demonstration
the roofpercept allegedly favoured thedifferentpigment interpreta-
tion. It remains unclear as to the reason for these different percepts.
Both studiesnevertheless reveal the importanceof surfacegeometry
for the perception of illumination versus pigment.
Heuristic 7. A luminance change accompanied by a change in
surface orientation is likely to be shading, whereas one unaccom-
panied by a change in surface orientation is likely to be change
in reﬂectance.
Heuristic 8. The colours of concave-shaped surfaces are likely to
be in part due to inter-reﬂected light.
2.3.2. Depth cues
The importance of depth relations for the perception of light ver-
sus material was revealed in a classic experiment by Gilchrist illus-
trated in Fig. 9 (Gilchrist, 1977; 1980; reviewed by Rock, 1977, and
Gilchrist, 2006; see also experiments by Schirillo, Reeves, & Arend,
1990). When observers viewed the arrangement monocularly, as
shown on the right, they perceived the two protruding patches as
Fig. 7. If either (a) the border of the transparency, or (b) the border of the background changes orientation at the X-junction, the impression of transparency is lost; ﬁgures
based on Kanizsa (1979). (c) A straight edge with X-junctions (left) elicits a strong impression of a transparency/shadow border, but if the edge is curved (right) it appears to
be a pigment change; from Logvinenko et al. (2005), reproduced with permission.
Fig. 8. Surface geometry can affect the perception of shading versus pigment. (a) A change in luminance is perceived as shading if accompanied by a change in surface
orientation (a–b), but a change in pigment if unaccompanied by a change in surface orientation (a–c). An incidental fact is that the luminances b and c are the same. (b)
Surface curvature can switch the percept of a brightness change from pigment to shading; from Knill and Kersten (1991), reproduced with permission.















Fig. 9. Gilchrist’s (1980) stimulus used to establish the coplanarity principle. See
text for details. Reproduced from Gilchrist (2006) with permission.
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stances the lower patch appeared almost white while the upper
patch appeared almost black. With binocular viewing however,
observers saw the patchesprotrudingwith theupper patch coplanar
with the black background and the lower patch coplanar with the
white background. Now the patches appeared similar in lightness.
What seems to be happening in this display is that subjects per-
ceived the lightnesses of the patches as if they are illuminated by
the same light as that illuminating the region with which they are
coplanar. This observation led Gilchrist to formulate the ‘coplanar
ratio principle’, which states that luminance changes between reti-
nally-adjacent but non-coplanar papers play little or no role in light-
ness perception. It was Rock (1977) however who grasped the
signiﬁcance of Gilchrist’s experiment for the lightness versus mate-
rial issue, arguing that it revealed an in-built assumption that lumi-
nance differences within a depth plane are likely to be reﬂectance
differences, whereas luminance differences between depth planes
are likely to be illumination differences. The importance of this
assumption is obvious when one considers the many situations in
which other cues to non-uniform illumination, such as X-junctions
and penumbra, are occluded by closer objects.
The impression of transparency is enhanced when the transpar-
ent layer is perceived to lie in front of the background (Anderson
et al., 2006; Gurnsey et al., submitted for publication; Kingdom,
Blakeslee, & McCourt, 1997). A categorical change in transparency
perception dependent on relative depth can be seen in Nakayama
and Shimojo’s (1992) stereo display shown in Fig. 9f. When fused
stereoscopically, the red bars appear projected in front in one ste-
reo-image and behind in the other. In the former condition one
perceives a delicate red-tinted transparency ﬂoating in front of
the white cross, whereas in the latter condition one perceives a
red form occluded by the black square. The wider theoretical sig-
niﬁcance of this experiment will be discussed later, but for now
it sufﬁces as a powerful demonstration of the potential effect of
depth ordering on transparency versus pigment perception.
Heuristic 9. Luminance changes within a depth plane are likely
to be reﬂectance changes, whereas luminance changes between
depth planes are likely to be caused by different illumination.
2.4. Colour
2.4.1. Colour is material
In natural scenes most chromatic variations are changes in
material, such as from pigment, whereas luminance variationsare either changes in material or non-uniform illumination. These
relationships can be observed in the photograph in Fig. 10c. The
grass-pavement border is a change in both luminance and colour,
whereas the shadow border is primarily a change in luminance.
This suggests a simple rule: luminance edges that are co-aligned
with chromatic edges are material changes, whereas luminance
edges that are non-co-aligned with chromatic edges are illumina-
tion changes (Rubin & Richards, 1982). Although the potential use-
fulness of this rule for layer identiﬁcation has been questioned on
the grounds that shadows and shading are often coloured (Gil-
christ, 2006), as in the bluing of deep shadows on sunny days
(Churma, 1994), it has nevertheless proved effective in com-
puter-vision algorithms designed to separate images into their
reﬂectance and illumination layers (Finlayson, Hordley, & Drew,
2002a; Finlayson, Hordley, & Drew, 2002b; Olmos & Kingdom,
2004; Tappen, Freeman, & Adelson, 2003).
But what of perception? Notwithstanding that colour changes
can under many circumstances be perceived to be caused by illu-
mination (e.g. see previous section), Fig. 10b is evidence for the col-
our-is-material assumption. The building appears to be painted
two-thirds orange, yet the orange part is in fact sunset illumination
shining on a grey surface. Fig. 10d shows another photograph in
which a shadow crosses a pigment boundary, forming an X-junc-
tion. In black-and-white (left), the edges of the junction are percep-
tually ambiguous when removed from their context (see inset),
whereas the colour version (right) is less ambiguous.
The most powerful evidence in support of the colour-is-mate-
rial assumption is the ‘colour-shading effect’ (Kingdom, 2003b;
Kingdom, Rangwala, & Hammamji, 2005; Kingdom, Wong, Yoon-
essi, & Malkoc, 2006), illustrated in Fig. 11a (taken from Shevell
& Kingdom, 2008). The luminance grating in Fig. 11a-i appears al-
most ﬂat, yet when combined with the orthogonally oriented chro-
matic grating in Fig. 11a-ii produces a ‘‘plaid”, as in Fig. 11a-iii. The
plaid appears corrugated in depth, an example of shape-from-
shading. In the plaid the changes in luminance are not aligned to
the changes in colour, and this promotes the perceptual interpreta-
tion that the luminance variations are due to shading not pigment,
characteristic of a corrugated surface illuminated obliquely. If the
colour-is-material assumption is true, then one would predict that
if the luminance variations in the plaid were now accompanied by
corresponding colour variations, then the percept of shading and
thus depth should be lost. This is exactly what happens. Adding a
second colour grating in alignment with the luminance grating,
as in Fig. 11a-iv, strongly reduces the impression of corrugated
depth.
2.4.2. Colour transparency
The colour-is-material assumption also impacts transparency
perception. Using stimuli similar to those illustrated in Fig. 11b-i–
iii, Kingdomet al. (2004) found that ‘‘good” shadows/transparencies,
i.e. those that exhibited luminance ratio invariance (see Section
2.1.1) were more easily identiﬁed when presented on chromati-
cally-variegated (Fig. 11b-ii) compared to achromatically-varie-
gated (Fig. 11b-i) backgrounds (see also Kingdom & Kasrai, 2006).
In addition, along with other studies (Ripamonti & Westland,
2003), they found that the introduction of random colour changes
across the transparencyborder (Fig. 11b-iii) disrupted the identiﬁca-
tion of ‘‘good” shadows/transparencies. The key to the negative im-
pact of colour contrast on transparency perception however is that
the colour changes are random. If the colour changes are consistent
along the length of the transparency border, that is, always toward a
particular color—blue in the example in Fig. 11b-iv—one retains a
strong impression of transparency, but this time of a colored trans-
parency such as color-tinted acetate (D’Zmura, Colantoni, Knobl-
auch, & Laget 1997; Fulvio, Singh, & Maloney, 2006; Khang & Zaidi
2002; Ripamonti & Westland 2003). Chromatic consistency at I-
Fig. 10. (a) AMBEGUJAS stimulus based on Jakobsson et al. (1997), reproduced with permission. See text for details. (b) The orange colour of the tower block looks like paint
but is in fact sunset illumination on a grey surface; photo courtesy of B. Micklethwait. (c) Shadow cast across a grass-pavement border reveals the spatial relations between
colour and luminance in natural scenes. (d) Black-and-white (left) and colour (right) photograph of a wall with cast shadow. The insets showing the X-junction reveal how
colour can disambiguate which border is pigment and which illumination. Taken from Kingdom et al. (2004); original colour photo courtesy of J. Marvullo and taken from
Color vision: A photographer’s guide. New York: Watson-Guptill Publications, 1989, p58. (e) Neon-colour spreading, courtesy of H. Knuchel, from http://www.blelb.ch/. (f)
When free-fused, one of the stereo-pairs reveals a red disk occluded by a black square, the other a red transparent ﬁlm ﬂoating in front of a white cross; based on Nakayama
and Shimojo (1992), reproduced with permission.
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Fig. 10e. The compelling impression one can obtain of a colored sha-
dow or transparency is a counter-example to the colour-is-material
assumption, but the percept occurs only in circumstances where
there is already strong evidence for shadow or transparency, for
example from X-junctions, as in Fig. 11b.Heuristic 10. Luminance changes that are aligned with chro-
matic changes are perceived as pigment, whereas luminance
changes that are non-aligned with chromatic changes are per-
ceived as illumination.
Heuristic 11. Providing there are sufﬁcient cues to the presence
of a shadow or transparency, chromatic changes that are consistent
Fig. 11. (a) colour can promote or inhibit shape-from-shading. (i) Right oblique
luminance grating; (ii) left oblique chromatic grating; (iii) Combining (i) and (ii)
gives the impression of a depth-corrugated surface; (iv) adding a second chromatic
grating aligned with the luminance grating in (ii) inhibits the impression of depth.
(b) An achromatic non-reﬂective transparency/shadow on (i) a luminance-only b-
ackground and (ii) a same-luminance but added-colour background. In (iii) the
introduction of random colours changes across the transparency border reducs the
impression of transparency. In (iv) the colour changes across the transparency b-
order are systematic, e.g. all towards blue, giving rise to an impression of a colored
transparency. Both ﬁgures based on Shevell and Kingdom (2008), reproduced with
permission.




One might expect texture to operate in an analogous way to col-
our in facilitating the discrimination of light from material. The
supposition in this case is that luminance changes that are aligned
with texture changes are likely to be changes in reﬂectance,
whereas luminance changes that are non-aligned with texture
changes are likely to be changes in illumination or transparency,as in Fig. 10c. Although this may be true for some types of texture
variation, for example variations in the size of texture markings,
the situation is more complex for other types of texture variation,
particularly those deﬁned by orientation. Natural-scene textures
that vary in local orientation arise in the retinal image primarily
from changes in surface orientation (Knill, 2001; Li & Zaidi,
2000), and are exploited by vision for surface shape analysis (Li &
Zaidi, 2000). Since shading often accompanies a change in surface
orientation, it follows that a luminance change that is co-aligned
with an orientation-deﬁned texture boundary is not necessarily a
change in reﬂectance; on the contrary it will more likely be shad-
ing. It should therefore come as no surprise that shading and orien-
tation-deﬁned texture variations combine synergistically to
enhance surface shape perception (Kingdom et al., 2006; Mamas-
sian & Landy, 2001). Thus one might expect that the visual system
interprets as shading not only luminance changes that are non-
aligned with texture changes, but ones that are aligned provided
they are consistent with changes in surface orientation. Fig. 12c
however suggests that in the absence of other cues to shading (such
as non-sharp edges) the visual system is not so nuanced. Whereas
the square-wave luminance grating in Fig. 12b, which is non-
aligned with the orientation-deﬁned texture grating, appears to
be a shadow or transparency, the aligned-with-texture luminance
gratings in Fig. 12a and c both appear more like changes in albedo,
in spite of the fact that the texture variation in the latter ﬁgure is
consistent with a change in surface orientation. One way to test
this more thoroughly would be to compare the strengths of the
perceived depth corrugations with and without the luminance
grating, i.e. Fig. 12c compared to 12d. If the luminance grating in
Fig. 12c is perceived as shading, the perceived corrugations should
be larger in this stimulus.
Heuristic 12. Luminance changes unaccompanied by a change in
texture are likely to be changes in illumination.
2.6. Motion
The cues described above for colour and texture potentially ap-
ply also to motion. A luminance pattern that moves coherently
with colour, texture, shape etc. is likely to be a reﬂectance pattern,
whereas if it moves incoherently with these dimensions it is likely
to be a pattern of illumination or transparency. This principle has
been used to extract the reﬂectance map of a scene as the common
component when the scene is photographed under different light-
ing conditions (Weiss, 2001).
A stunning example of the importance of motion cues for layer
perception is Hartung & Kersten’s (2002; http://vision.psych.
umn.edu/users/kersten/kersten-lab/demos/MatteOrShiny.html)
‘Shiny versus Matte’ demonstration. When the pattern of specular
reﬂection on the surface of a simulated chrome teapot is made to
move incoherently with the teapot’s rotation, the impression of
specularity is enhanced. However, if the pattern is moved coher-
ently with the teapot’s rotation, the appearance of the teapot
changes dramatically from a shiny surface replete with specular
reﬂections, to a matte surface painted in shades of yellow and
brown.
Shadows can also be identiﬁed by incoherent motion. Jacobsen
and Werner (2004) presented subjects with cubes whose surfaces
were drawn with two patterns of luminance: stripes or leaves. As
the cube was moved, one of the patterns was moved coherently
with the cube’s motion whereas the other was not. Whichever pat-
tern was moved coherently was perceived as a reﬂectance pattern,
whereas the incoherently moving pattern was invariably perceived
as a shadow pattern.
Another cue to specular reﬂection is self-motion. When an ob-
server moves, so too do the observable specular reﬂections. This
does not happen with other types of non-uniform illumination
Fig. 12. Orientation-deﬁned texture cues to layer perception. In (a) the square-wave orientation and luminance changes are co-aligned, and the latter appears as pigment.
Shifting the relative phase of the luminance grating by 90 deg in (b) makes it appear as a shadow or transparency. In (c) the texture variation is consistent with a change in
surface orientation. The co-aligned luminance grating, although physically consistent with shading, does not appear to be shading. If it were shading one would expect the
perceived depth corrugations to be greater in (c) than in (d), where the luminance grating has been removed.
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any behavioural studies that have explored the efﬁcacy of self-mo-
tion as a cue to specular reﬂection, but it is likely to prove partic-
ularly important precisely because it is so unique to this form of
non-uniform illumination.
Heuristic 13. A luminance pattern that moves incoherently with
an object’s motion is likely to be a pattern of illumination, whereas
if it moves coherently with an object’s motion is likely to be a
reﬂectance pattern.
Heuristic 14. If a luminance pattern is perceived to move as the
observer moves it is likely to be specular reﬂection, otherwise it is
likely to be some other form of non-uniform illumination or a
reﬂectance pattern.
This completes the description of the physical cues available
and the likely heuristics employed by the visual system for dis-
criminating light from material. The following section discusses
certain theoretical issues that arise from the above analysis.
3. Theoretical considerations
3.1. Importance of layer perception
By and large we do not wander around the world pondering
whether luminance discontinuities look more like changes in
reﬂectance or more like changes in illumination (well some of us
admittedly do!). It is the behavioural consequences of light versus
material identiﬁcation that are, after all, what is important. Our
ability to discriminate light from material is important for our per-
ception of lightness, motion direction, depth, material composi-
tion, surface shape and object form. Some investigators regardlayer perception as a critical stage of visual processing, lying be-
tween local feature extraction and fully-ﬂedged object recognition,
with behavioural consequences that extend far beyond the range of
phenomena described here (Albert, 2001; Anderson, 1997, 2001,
2003; Nakayama, He, & Shimojo, 1995; Nakayama & Shimojo,
1992, 1996). On the other hand, one should not get too carried
away. Artists often paint shadows and shading in the wrong posi-
tions and with the wrong properties, yet one tends not to notice
(Cavanagh, 2005; Jacobsen & Werner, 2004). At the very least this
suggests that global scene organization is not an important con-
straint on whether a region is perceived as shadow or reﬂectance.
It also demonstrates that we still manage in spite of certain layer
misperceptions.
3.2. A bag of tricks?
The heuristics outlined above constitute a sort of shopping list
of rules used by vision for discriminating light from material, and
might be thought of as a ‘‘bag of tricks” (Ramachandran, 1990),
each pulled out of the bag as and when necessary. However the list
is neither exhaustive nor sufﬁciently quantiﬁed to enable any pre-
dictions to be made except for the simplest of laboratory stimuli. It
cannot be stressed enough that in the natural visual world multiple
cues as to what is material and what is light co-exist, and it is the
relative importance of each and the manner in which they are com-
bined that is crucial. For example, the heuristic that colour varia-
tions are material is immediately discarded when watching
cartoon ﬁlms with brightly coloured shadows, because other cues
such as motion and X-junctions render the shadows so effectively.
For the same reason most natural shadows that do not have
Fig. 13. Bayesian ‘‘explaining away” applied to Knill and Kersten’s (1991) double-
cylinder ﬁgure. See text for details. From Kersten et al. (2004), reproduced with
permission.
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gions painted in subtle shades are often correctly perceived as
paint, rather than as transparencies or changes in illumination.
Readers of this review will doubtless have their own examples of
heuristic failures, but should always bare in mind that the failures
occur probably because one or more other heuristics are operating
to promote the alternative interpretation.
The heuristics documented here embody knowledge of the reg-
ularities in the visual world, and these regularities add to those
identiﬁed as useful to vision by numerous investigators beginning
with Gibson (1979), and that include Marr (1982), Hoffman (1998)
and most recently Purves and Lotto (2003). However the heuristics
themselves say nothing about the mechanisms that implement
them. Marr (1982) famously identiﬁed three levels at which visual
processing could be analyzed: 1. identiﬁcation of the regularities in
the image exploited by vision for a particular computation; 2. the
nature of the input representation and the algorithm that performs
the computation; 3. the physiological hardware that implements
the algorithm. The heuristics here embody the ﬁrst, and to some
extent the second of Marr’s levels of analysis. If the goal of the
computation is to identify whether a boundary is a shadow or albe-
do, ratio-invariance is one of the regularities apparently exploited
by vision for this purpose. And one can easily envisage an algo-
rithm along the following lines: ﬁnd X-junction, compute contrasts
at all junction edges, determine if ratio invariance exists, label
junction as containing an illumination border etc. But with regard
to the third, implementation stage in Marr’s analysis, almost noth-
ing is known. To this author’s knowledge, there is no compelling
evidence of neurons that either detect X-junctions or are sensitive
to ratio-invariance in them. With some notable exceptions, such as
Motoyoshi et al’s (2007) suggestion that the relative activities of
On and Off cells might underpin the impression of specular reﬂec-
tion, the neural mechanisms that implement the heuristics de-
scribed above are neither known nor have even been guessed at.
So if little or nothing is known about the underlying physiology,
are there at least some general computational principles that we
can point to, or should we just be content with regarding the heu-
ristics as a bag of tricks?
3.3. Generic view principle
One mechanism that has been suggested to underpin some as-
pects of layer perception is the ‘‘generic view principle” (Hoffman,
1998; Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992, 1996, chap. 10; Freeman, 1994;
Albert, 2001; Nakayama et al., 1995). This states that the favoured
perceptual interpretation of an image is the one that is most invari-
ant to small changes in viewpoint. For example consider Fig. 10f. In
the stereo-pair in which the red bars project forward one perceives
a reddish ﬁlm ﬂoating in front of a white cross, rather than the
alternative interpretation of a red cross with wings that are V-
shaped in depth. According to the generic view principle, the red-
dish ﬁlm interpretation is the one most valid across all viewing an-
gles. The V-shaped wings interpretation would only be valid in the
very rare or ‘accidental’ circumstance in which the cross was
viewed precisely from the front, because only then would the cross
completely occlude the white background. The generic view prin-
ciple has been used to explain the conditions under which many
illusory surface phenomena occur, such as neon-colour spreading
(Hoffman, 1998) and specular reﬂection (Freeman, 1996), and it
will be interesting to see to what extent it is applicable to the other
layer percepts described here.
3.4. Bayesian estimation
An approach with potentially wider applicability than the gen-
eric view principle is Bayesian estimation (Kersten, Mamassian, &Yuille, 2004; Knill & Richards, 1996). Bayesian estimation offers
the possibility of testing whether prior knowledge of the regulari-
ties in the world is used optimally for making perceptual decisions.
The basic idea is that perceptual decisions are based on the compu-
tation of an a posteriori probability that a particular scene S is pres-
ent given the image I, or p(S|I). p(S|I) can be calculated as
proportional to the product of the likelihood of obtaining the image
given the scene p(I|S) and the prior probability of the scene p(S).
The generic view principle described above can in principle be
incorporated within a Bayesian framework (Freeman, 1994;
Nakayama & Shimojo 1996), though it has been argued that the
Bayesian approach is problematic for situations such as Fig. 10f, be-
cause the prior probability p(S) of a red-ﬂoating-transparency is
presumably very low, yet our impression of the ﬁgure is neverthe-
less compelling (Albert, 2001; Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992, 1996;
Nakayama et al., 1995).
Mamassian (personal communication) has suggested that some
of the heuristics described in this review could be considered with-
in the ‘‘explaining away” Bayesian framework described in Kersten
et al. (2004). The general idea is that if there are two alternative
hypotheses about a particular scene, one can ‘‘explain away” one
of the two hypotheses if there is auxiliary evidence favouring the
other. Fig. 13 illustrates how the idea applies to Knill and Kersten’s
(1991) demonstration of the effect of surface curvature on the
interpretation of a luminance edge. According to Kersten et al.
(2004), the two critical scene attributes in the ﬁgure are reﬂectance
and shape, and each has two interpretations: ‘discontinuous’ ver-
sus ‘uniform’ for the reﬂectance attribute, ‘ﬂat’ versus ‘curved’ for
the shape attribute. The two interpretations are coupled, i.e. dis-
continuous reﬂectance with ﬂat shape (left), uniform reﬂectance
with curved shape (right). The Bayesian equation that captures
‘‘explaining away” in Fig. 13 is:
pðS1; S2jI1; I2Þ / pðI2jS2ÞpðI1jS1; S2ÞpðS1ÞpðS2Þ
where the posterior probability p(S1, S2 | I1, I2) is the probability of
choosing one over the other of the two possible coupled scene inter-
pretations. p(S1) and p(S2), are the prior probabilities that scenes
have uniform reﬂectance and curved shapes, respectively. The like-
lihood function p(I1|S1, S2) is the probability of obtaining a lumi-
nance change (termed shading in the ﬁgure) given uniform
reﬂectance and a curved shape. The other likelihood function
p(I2|S2) concerns the auxiliary information, and is the probability
that a curved contour would arise in the image given a curved
2104 F.A.A. Kingdom /Vision Research 48 (2008) 2090–2105shape. As this probability increases, the posterior probability that
the scene is uniform in reﬂectance and curved in shape also in-
creases. Mamassian suggests that this framework could be applied
to some of the other phenomena described in this review, for exam-
ple the colour-shading effect (Kingdom, 2003b), in which the intro-
duction of non-aligned chromatic variations enhances shape-from-
shading in a luminance pattern. Although there are good examples
in the literature of how both prior probabilities and likelihood func-
tions can be measured experimentally (e.g. Mamassian & Landy,
2001), it remains to be seen whether the Bayesian framework can
be used to generate testable predictions as to the precise stimulus
conditions that favour percepts of light rather than material.
4. Conclusion
Humans rarely confuse spatio-temporal variations in light from
variations in albedo or pigment. This ability is achieved through
the deployment of a range of heuristics that embody knowledge
of the cues that exist as to what is light and what is material. How-
ever we currently have little understanding of how the heuristics
are weighted and how they combine in situations where multiple
cues co-exist. The generic view principle and Bayesian estimation
offer a possible computational framework for understanding the
perception of light versus material, and this will hopefully be com-
plemented in the future by single-unit recordings and brain imag-
ing studies that reveal the underlying physiology and anatomy.
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